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HABEAS CORPUS-EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES-DENIAL OF
CERTIORARI BY SuPREME CouRT As CoNDITION To OBTAINING ORIGINAL WRIT IN FEDERAL D1sTRICT CouRT-The expanded concept of
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment during the past
thirty years has brought increased inquiry by the federal courts into
state criminal procedure.1 A common method of bringing such matters
to the Supreme Court's attention has been the use of habeas corpus,
particularly following con£.nement.2 But this increased vigilance over
state criminal procedure has wrought an increasingly tender conscience
on the part of the federal courts over resulting interference with state
court systems. The theoretical problem has been further amplified on

1 E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472
(1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938).
2 E.g., Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964 (1942); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935).
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the practical level by the flood of petitions, largely frivolous or perjured,3 by persons in .state custody alleging convictions in violation of
constitutional safeguards. The result has been a series of cases wherein
these conflicting motivations and considerations have produced a confusing pattern for persons seeking relief by habeas corpus.

I
Statutory and Case Development of Scope and Application of
Habeas Corpus
The first Judiciary Act of 17894 provided that federal judges and
justices should have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus whenever a prisoner was held in federal custody or was to be brought into
court to testify, a concept essentially that of the common law. But in
the post-Civil War period Congress greatly expanded the scope of the
writ to "all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States ... ,"5 and this concept is embodied in the present United
States Code. 6
In analyzing the course of Supreme Court decisions in this field,
one must consider the development of mode of appeal of constitutional
questions from state tribunals to the Supreme Court, for today the most
troublesome questions involving application of habeas corpus are procedural in nature. In the first Judiciary Act7 appeal was by writ of
error where a decision of a state appellate court was against any right,
title, privilege or ~'exemption" set up under the Constitution, or any
treaty, statute or commission of the United States: This concept was
retained through various re-enactments of the Judiciary Act!' until
1925, when review in such cases was made available only by certiorari.9
This represented a change from review as a matter of right to review
as a matter of discretion, a concept enacted into curr~t procedural
law.10
Around these statutory provisions the· Supreme Court gradually
built up a body of case law going_ beyond the simple statutory requirea See 8 F.R.D.. 171, 172 (1948); 7 F.R.D. 313 (1947); Jackson's dissent in Price v.
Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 at 296, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948).
4 1 Stat. L. 86 (1789).
Ii 14 Stat. L. 385 (1867).
6 28 u.s.c. (1948) §2241.
11 Stat. L. 86 (1789).
s E.g., 14 Stat. L. 386 (1867); 36 Stat. L. 1156 (1911); 39 Stat. L. 726 (1916).
9 43 Stat. L. 937 (1925).
10 28 u.s.c. (1948) §1257.
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ments. At first, as a matter of discretion, when solicited on the basis
of pre-trial pleadings, federal courts refused to issue writs in favor of
one held in state custody. 11 This was extended to cover cases where
no appeal had been taken to state appellate courts,12 from which the
doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies as a condition precedent to
federal relief was derived.13 Meanwhile, the Court had refused to permit original habeas corpus proceedings in lower federal courts unless,
pursuant to statute, writ of error from adverse decisions of the highest
state courts having jurisdiction over the matter had been sought.14 But
it was not until Ex parte Hawk15 that the Court finally combined these
two lines of decisions. Hawk, alleging denial of due process through
failure to provide counsel in a capital case, had previously attempted to
gain a hearing on the merits of his case having been refused on procedural grounds several times.16 The Court, determining that yet another route lay open to him under Nebraska procedure, refused his
petition, using in the course of the opinion the following language:
"Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained
under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies available,
including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this court
by appeal or writ of certiorari have been exhausted."17
11Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734 (1886).
12Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516, 6 S.Ct. 848 (1886).
13 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935); Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S.
412, 63 S.Ct. 679 (1943); Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219, 64 S.Ct. 13 (1943);
Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946); Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S.
804, 68 S.Ct. 1212 (1948). These latter cases discuss the question of adequacy of state
remedies to test constitutional issues. See in general 48 MxcH. L. REv. 369 (1950).
14£,g. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 11 S.Ct. 738 (1891); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171
U.S. 101, 18 S.Ct. 805 (1898); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 27 S.Ct. 459 (1907);
United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 46 S.Ct. 1 (1925).
1r; 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).
16 The history of Hawk's litigation may be summarized as follows: Habeas corpus
refused in Nebraska district court, affirmed Nebraska Supreme Court in Hawk v. O'Grady,
137 Neb. 639, 290 N.W. 9ll (1940), cert. den. 311 U.S. 645, 61 S.Ct. II (1940);
federal district court refused habeas corpus, affirmed (8th Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 910,
cert. den. 317 U.S. 697, 63 S.Ct. 435 (1943); Nebraska Supreme Court refused original
writ without opinion; United States Supreme Court denied original petition, Ex parte
Hawk, 318 U.S. 746, 63 S.Ct. 991 (1943); after the principal case Nebraska Supreme
Court affirmed denial of writ by lower state court, Hawk v. Olson, 145 Neb. 306, 16 N.W.
(2d) 181 (1944), reversed on merits, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S.Ct. 116 (1945); Nebraska
Supreme Court explained former opinion to mean only that habeas corpus not proper
remedy, Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N.W. (2d) 136 (1946); federal district court
refused writ because coram nobis available (D.C. Neb. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 195, affirmed
(8th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 807; coram nobis denied on merits and affirmed by Nebraska
Supreme Court, Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W. (2d) 561 (1949); cert. den.
339 U.S. 923, 70 S.Ct. 984 (1950).
17Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. ll4 at 116, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944), citing Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935); Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219, 64
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But the Court, speaking through Justice Murphy, retreated from
this position in Wade v. Mayo. 18 Wade had not sought certiorari following denial of habeas corpus by the Florida Supreme Court. Yet a
later application for habeas corpus in federal district court was granted,
the court of appeals reversing in part because no application for certiorari had been made to the Supreme Court subsequent to the adverse
state court decision.19 On review the Supreme Court held that at the
discretion of the district judge the writ could be granted, despite failure
to seek certiorari. All available state court remedies had been exhausted;
thus federal-state conB.ict was not a relevant issue. The sole remaining
question was determination of the proper federal forum, with failure
to seek certiorari merely an element to be considered in exercise of
discretion. "Good judicial administration is not furthered by insistence
on futile procedure."20 Denial of certiorari did not necessarily rest on
the merits, and should not be a requirement in seeking review of conviction, particularly since the Supreme Court retained the ultimate
power of review and decision.
For two years the law stood thus. But in the recent case of Darr v.
Burford21 the Court re-examined its position, and while not overruling
Wade v. Mayo outright, adopted a position inconsistent with that case
by reaffirming statements made in Ex parte Hawk. Rejecting the arguments advanced in the Wade case, Justice Reed insisted, as in his dissent to Wade v. Mayo, that certiorari is and has been a step in state
procedure within the meaning of the exhaustion of remedies rule;
failure to seek certiorari following the adverse state court decision
destroys any opportunity for the constitutional issue to be raised by
()riginal petition in federal district court. Since Darr had not appealed
the adverse ruling of the Oklahoma Supreme Court on his petition,
further federal relief was precluded.

II
Basic Principles Underlying Darr v. Burford
The basic principle by which the Court justifies its present position
is that of federal-state comity. Under the dual system of government
S.Ct. 13 (1943); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 18 S.Ct. 805 (1898); Urquhart v.
Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 27 S.Ct. 459 (1907); United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269
U.S. 13, 46 S.Ct. 1 (1925).
1s 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
19 Mayo v. Wade, (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 614.
2owade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 at 681, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
21339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
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under the Constitution federal courts are desirous of avoiding conllict
with a state judicial system until it has finally disposed of a matter. In
particular, no inferior federal court should overrule a superior state
court, a primary consideration in the early Royall22 and Fonda2 3 cases
and their successors. But opposed to this restraining influence on exercise of federal power is the duty of the federal courts to protect the
individual against state denial of due process of law, which results in
an inevitable interference with the exercise of state power. Ex parte
Hawk, Wade 11. Mayo, and Darr 11. Burford illustrate the inconsistencies which occur when emphasis of the Court shifts from one consideration to the other.
As the first definitive case, Ex parte Hawk concerned itself primarily
with state-federal conllict. Federal courts will "interfere with administration of justice in the state courts only 'in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.' " 24
However, in Wade 11. Mayo emphasis lay on safeguarding the
rights of the individual. To Justice Murphy, only the Court's own
procedural requirements were an issue at the post-state level. "Moreover, the flexible nature of the writ of habeas corpus counsels against
erecting a rigid procedural rule that has the effect of imposing a new
jurisdictional limitation on the writ. Habeas corpus is presently available for use by a district court within its recognized jurisdiction whenever necessary to prevent an unjust and illegal deprivation of human
liberty."25 Comity was insufficient reason for erecting yet another procedural barrier between the habeas corpus petitioner and adjudication
of the merits of his claim.
But in Darr 11. Burford comity has again .become controlling.
"... since the 1867 statute granted jurisdiction to federal courts to
examine into alleged unconstitutional restraint of prisoners by state
power it created an area of potential conllict between state and federal
courts. Solution was found in the doctrine of comity between courts,
a doctrine which teaches that one court should defer action on causes
properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have
parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734 (1886).
parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516, 6 S.Ct. 848 (1886).
parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 at 117, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944), quoting from United
States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 46 S.Ct. 1 (1925). Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923), involving a mob-dominated trial, is cited as such a rare and
exceptional case in both Ex parte Hawk and Darr v. Burford.
21, Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 at 681, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
22Ex
23 Ex
24Ex
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had an opportunity to pass upon the matter." 26 If the procedural steps
depending on the principle have not been followed, relief on the merits
is thereby precluded.
Since the position of the Court seems to vary with acceptance or
repudiation of the comity principle, the validity of its application to the
certiorari problem must be determined to evaluate the correctness of
the Court's present position. The objection to granting the writ in the
Hawk-Wade-Darr situation is that a lower federal court by its action is
thus overruling a high state court. But the highest state court having
jurisdiction has acted on the matter, and presumably in these cases all
available remedies in state courts have been exhausted. If, therefore,
under state procedure no further state relief is available, and the petition has been denied on the merits, federal courts should be free to
exercise their co~stitutional authority and examine into whether or
not petitioner has been deprived of his rights. Statutory requirements
for federal habeas corpus have been met. Nor have the district courts
usurped the activities of the Supreme Court, for they merely screen
such cases for higher federal courts by establishing the facts and merits
of the claim. Since the Supreme Court ultimately has the power to
overturn a state court decision on constitutional grounds, the federalstate comity problem remains the same whether the Supreme Court
reverses on certiorari from the state court, or by certiorari from lesser
federal courts. There is much to be said for Justice Murphy's view in
Wade v. Mayo that when state procedure has once ended, the problem
becomes one of appropriate federal tribunal. Comity is a factor in any
constitutional review, and since the district court does not in any case
have final authority to overrule a state decision, it should not prevent
such district court from having the constitutional authority to grant
habeas corpus. If this reasoning is correct in principle, then comity
should not effect an insurmountable barrier by requiring certiorari in
any case before district courts can entertain habeas corpus petitions.
Furthermore, though comity has produced the exhaustion of remedies rule, one must determine if in fact certiorari is a part of the state
remedy for comity purposes. Ex parte Hawk made the first categorical
statement to this effect.27 But among supporting authority cited, two
cases28 dealt solely with exhaustion of state remedies within the state
2a Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 204, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
U.S. 114 at 116, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).
294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935); Ex parte Abernathy, 320
U.S. 219, 64 S.Ct. 13 (1943).
27Ex parte Hawk, 321
28 Mooney v. Holohan,
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courts, while three cases29 required that a writ of error be sued out
before relief could be sought independently in district court. But a
writ of error was a writ of right, 30 and it was reasonable to require that
the Supreme Court be solicited to fulfill its statutory duty before independent relief was sought. The reasoning of these writ of error cases
does not necessarily apply to discretionary review by certiorari. Disposition on writ of error was conclusive on the merits; reasons for refusal
of certiorari are myriad and indeterminable in any given case. 31 Furthermore, the statements of Ex parte Hawk concerning certiorari may
be considered gratuitous, for the final disposition of Hawk's petition
was based on his failure to seek coram nobis, and consequently his
failure to exhaust available state remedies. If so, then failure to seek
certiorari was irrelevant to the issue;32 the statement may well be
dictum. If dictum, then Ex parte Hawk is not a precedent for "reaffirmance" by Darr 11. Burford,33 and Wade 11. Mayo has been overruled.

III
Effect of the 1948 Judicial Code

The foregoing discussion has ignored the possible effect of section
2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which provides:

"An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State...."
In the reviser's note to the section it is stated:
"This new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by
the Supreme Court. (See Ex parte Hawk, 1944, 64 S.Ct. 448,
321 U.S. 114, 88 L. Ed. 572)."34
29Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 18 S.Ct. 805 (1898); Urquhart v. Brown, 205
U.S. 179, 27 S.Ct. 459 (1907); United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 46
S.Ct. 1 (1925).
ao Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 237, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
s1 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 at 680, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948); Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200 at 227, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
32 The same could have been said of Wade v. Mayo had it been brought up immediately, since it was not until later Florida decisions that it became apparent that there had
been a decision on the federal constitutional issue. See Syllabus of the Court, Wade v.
Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
33Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 S.Ct. 1073 (1948), which also "affirmed" the
Hawk statement, also turned on exhaustion of state court remedies and may be open to the
same objection.
34 H. Rep. 308 on H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. A180 (1947). See also S. Rep.
1559, 80th Cong., 2d sess., p. 9 (1948).
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However, prior to the passage of the Code, but following submission
of committee reports, Wade v. Mayo was decided, so that the Hawk
rule had been thus modified at the time of actual passage. Nevertheless, in Darr v. Burford the majority based their opinion somewhat:
heavily on the effect of this section on the Court's freedom to change
what it considered to be the Hawk rule, for they did not consider Wade
v. Mayo as a clear modification of Ex parte Hawk.35 The dissent disagreed that any such retention of the certiorari rule was required by section 2254. ·Perhaps this reliance on the statute by the majority was unwarranted. In the first place, the statutory language says nothing about
remedies other than those "available in the courts of the State"; it would
be stretching the statutory language to say the Supreme Court for any
purpose is a state court. Nor is certiorari anywhere indicated as a state
remedy. In the second place, even though the pre-enactment: materials
indicate a desire to perpetuate the rule of Ex parte Hawk, in light of
the language and ultimate disposition of the case, Congress could well
have been concerned solely with exhaustion of intra-state procedural
remedies. If the language dealing with certiorari as a condition to
relief is in fact dictum, one can justify a position that the reviser's note
endorsed the actual disposition of the case, and not all incidental statements by the Court, of which the certiorari rule is one. In the third
place, since Wade v. Mayo was handed down prior to passage of the
act, .it cannot be said with certainty-if indeed in the determination
of legislative intent anything can be said with certainty-that: both
Wade and Hawk were not in the collective mind of Congress at time
of passage. The Court, as it has done in the past:,36 might well have
considered evidence of legislative intent too ambiguqus and indeterminate to be helpful. 37 One might with some justification conclude that,
under the guise of stare decisis and expression of legislative intent as a
limitation on judicial power, a bit of judicial legislation has been engrafted onto section 2254.
35 "Whatever deviation Wade may imply from the established rule will be corrected
by this decision." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 210, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
86 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lemoot, 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945).
87 Furthermore, the Court changed a judicial rule where there was stronger indication
that Congress had considered the ruling and failed to take action, in Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61, 66 S.Ct. 826 (1946), when it repudiated its interpretation of the
naturalization oath laid down in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 49 S.Ct.
448 (1929) and United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S.Ct. 570 (1931) after
Congress had several times re-enacted the oath without change after being strongly urged
to do so. The specific matter of certiorari as a part of state remedies was apparently never
before Congress during consideration of §2254.
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IV
Conclusions

In evaluating the present view of the Supreme Court it would seem
that one must first determine which position he prefers-stressing
availability of remedy to persons in need of it at risk of their abusing
the privilege, or setting up rigid procedural rules which bar the innocent with the guilty. Perhaps the present certiorari requirement in
truth represents more a fear of being overburdened by a rash of spurious habeas corpus petitions than a genuine fear of interference with
state procedure. If the former, then to add a mandatory certiorari requirement, useless or not,38 tends to increase the Court's own case load
instead of screening out numerous applicants, for once Darr v. Burford
has made its effect felt, convicts will be careful to include the Supreme
Court on their roster of tribunals before which relief will be sought.
Discretion might well be left to district courts in order to ease some of
this burden. Insofar as the comity rule is in fact a real and basic reason
in the Court's thinking, it does not require the result of Darr v. Burford. On the practical level district courts have not been lavish in granting writs of habeas corpus.39 On the theoretical plane, despite the procedural hurdle of Darr v. Burford, district courts may interfere with
state court decisions eventually when certiorari has been denied. Indeed, as due process concepts under the Fourteenth Amendment are
expanded, conllict between state and federal courts will be inevitable
and increasing. Despite Darr v. Burford, the conllict problem remains,
and emphasis on comity may be misplaced.· Furthermore, some confusion is bound to occur among lower federal courts as a result of the
opinion, for language in the majority opinion intimates that denial of
certiorari may guide district court action subsequently,40 another indication of the lurking fear of interference with superior state tribunals
on the part of district courts. A district judge must thus speculate on
the possible reasons for denial of the writ, even though the Court itself
may have been in disagreement as to the reason. 41 Nor would a specific statement in the denial of certiorari, allowing the district court to
3s Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 216, 238, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
39 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 233, note 3, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950); 10 Omo STATE
L.J. 337 at 357 (1949).
40 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 215, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950). Justices Clark and
Burton, concurring, refused to accept this implication of the majority opinion.
41Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 227, 7o·s.Ct. 587 (1950); Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672 at 680, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
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proceed, aid in the problem, for no implication that such action should
not be undertaken may be drawn from the failure to include such language in a denial. 42 The rule of Wade 11. Mayo, it is submitted, provided a desirable flexibility in procedure43 and would not seem to be
contrary to the language or even the probable legislative intent of section 2254. In its desire to reduce the number of habeas corpus petitions
in federal courts, the Court ought not erect rigid procedural requirements which bar the worthy as well as the unworthy.

B.

J. George, Jr., S.Ed.

42 Such a statement was used in Burke v. Geor~a, 338 U.S. 941, 70 S.Ct. 422 (1949).
''The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case, as the bar has been told so many times," Holmes, J. in United States v. Carver, 260
U.S. 482 at 490, 43 S.Ct. 181 (1923). See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 at 232,
note 2, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
43 " ••• I would not bolt the door to such an undesirable practice as a matter of law,
but merely leave it as a rigorous rule of practice. . • • The power to depart from this rule
ought not to be wholly foreclosed, even though opportunity for its exercise is left for contingencies not wholly foreseeable." Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S.
266 at 295, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948), where the Court upheld the right of a habeas corpus
petitioner to have a hearing on allegations of his petition in every case. See also MooRB,
CoMMENT.ARY ON nm UNITED STATES JUDICIAL Com! 466 (1949).

